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REPLY TO STATEMENT OF QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that 
"[b]ased upon the undisputed facts of record and equities between 
the parties, the court concludes the doctrine of equitable 
subrogation as claimed by defendant Security Pacific is not 
applicable in this case." (Opinion, page 2) The courts did not 
change existing law that equitable subrogation may be applicable in 
a proper fact situation. It is simply not applicable in the fact 
situation before the court. 
The defendant had actual/or constructive notice of the 
painting and remodeling work that appellee was performing for at 
least nine days prior to the time the subject property was 
refinanced. The application of constructive notice is favored by 
law in cases interpreting mechanic's lien laws. Notice to the 
appellants was only one of many factual reasons in this case that 
would bar the application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 
However, knowledge (actual or constructive) by the appellant of the 
pending work would have been sufficient by itself to bar 
application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation in this 
particular fact situation. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction arises from the decision of the Utah Court 
of Appeals in the matter of J. LaMar Richards v. Security Pacific 
National Bank, Case No. 920679-CA filed March 9, 1993, as reported 
in 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 81 and is not disputed. 
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APPLICABLE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated, 38-1-5: 
Priority - Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate 
back to, and take effect as of, the time of 
the commencement to do work or furnish 
materials on the ground for the structure or 
improvement, and shall have priority over any 
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may 
have attached subsequently to the time when 
the building, improvement or structure was 
commenced, work begun, or first material 
furnished on the ground; also over any lien, 
mortgage or other encumbrance of which the 
lien holder had no notice and which was 
unrecorded at the time the building, structure 
or improvement was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellee is a painting contractor who performed painting 
services beginning before June 29, 1988, which were described in 
his lien as "prepare, repair, prime and paint exterior of house and 
garage." When the painting and repair services were not paid for, 
a lien was filed and subsequently a foreclosure action was 
commenced. Security Pacific was named in the suit as the successor 
in interest to Ameristar Financial Corporation which had performed 
the original financing. 
In July 1988, the month following commencement of 
appellee's painting work, the subject property was conveyed to < 
Debra Youngman by Lafayette Properties (of which Youngman was an 
officer) by a deed signed by Youngman's business associate Deborah 
Diamanti. On the same day Ameristar Financial Corporation i 
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consolidated several loans and encumbrances against the property 
and refinanced the property for $320,000. During the refinancing, 
the bank paid to Lafayette Properties $53,546.00. Lafayette's 
interest was unrecorded at the time the painting work commenced. 
The amount of the encumbrances against the property was increased 
over the combined amounts of several previously existing 
encumbrances. Prior to refinancing, the property was appraised by 
the financing institutions at over $500,000. After the 
refinancing, defendant immediately defaulted on payments of the 
loan and foreclosure was commenced. Appellant acquired the 
property at the trust deed sale, receiving the benefits of 
appellee's materials and painting services for itself. 
The appellant bank defended the mechanic's lien action, 
claiming that under the concept of equitable subrogation it should 
be placed in the position of the various individuals or entities 
whose loans it paid off when the house was refinanced after the 
commencement of the painting work. The trial court found that the 
facts and equities did not warrant application of the doctrine of 
equitable subrogation and ruled in plaintiff's favor. The Court of 
Appeals found that the doctrine of equitable subrogation should not 
be applied in this fact situation and affirmed the decision of the 
trial court. 
Proceedings and Disposition Below 
From cross motions for summary judgment, the Hon. Pat B. 
Brian, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, found that the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation is not applicable to the facts 
3 
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and equities of this case and ruled in plaintiff's favor. The 
court's order was entered on August 20, 1991. Security Pacific 
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial 
court's decision on March 9, 1993. 
Response to Statement of Facts 
The following Statements of Fact in appellant's Petition 
are either inaccurate or misleading or not supported by the record. 
Appellant's Statements of Fact #1 and #2 are misleading. 
The date when the property was purchased by Debra Youngman is 
uncertain. Although the Uniform Real Estate Contract was dated 
1985, it was not recorded until after the commencement of 
appellee's painting work. It was notarized in 1988 by an agent of 
Youngman's corporation whose notary expired in 1992. It is 
uncertain from the record whether the actual contract to purchase 
the property from Youngman's corporation was executed prior to or 
after the commencement of the painting work. (Record, pages 112-
121) 
Appellant's Statement of Fact #10 is misleading because 
it suggests that defendant Youngman did not benefit from the loan 
proceeds. Youngman was an owner and executive officer of a 
corporation known as Lafayette Properties (Lafayette) which 
conveyed the property to Youngman after the commencement of 
appellee's work. Lafayette received $53,546.00 from the closing. < 
The details of how Lafayette distributed the money to Youngman was 
not an issue the trial court addressed. (Record, p. 145) 
Appellant's Statement of Fact #16 is misleading. At the ( 
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time Mr. Richards began his work, the alleged contract whereby 
Lafayette Sold the property to its owner/officer Debra Youngman was 
not recorded and therefore was not a senior encumbrance to Mr. 
Richards' lien. When the subject contract was actually signed is 
questionable. (Record, pp. 99, 101, 112, 121) 
Appellant's Statement of Fact #18 leaves incorrect 
inferences. The boiler plate small print of the bank form states 
that borrower (Youngman) has not "...agreed to ... permit any lien 
upon the property to secure a debt or loan." However, at the time 
the document was filed no lien had been filed and the financing 
institutions were either actually or constructively aware of the 
painting work in progress. The record does not reveal whether the 
financing institution had actual knowledge. However, it is clear 
that its client Youngman had actual notice. (Record, pp. 214-215) 
Appellant's Statements of Fact #19 and #20 describing 
Ameristar's expectations are disputed and not supported by the 
record. There is no evidence showing what the "expectation of 
Ameristar" may have been. Ameristar did not answer the Complaint 
and its default was entered. The affidavit filed alleging what 
Ameristar's expectations were was signed by a person who was not an 
employee of Ameristar when the subject loan transaction occurred 
and was not based on personal knowledge of the facts pertaining to 
this incident. (Record, pp. 172, 178, 205-209) 
Appellant's Statement of Fact #21 is incomplete and 
leaves incorrect inferences in describing the assignments from 
Ameristar to appellant Security Pacific via another bank. The 
5 
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assignments were not recorded for seven months after the purported 
dates of their execution. Richards1 lien was recorded in November 
1988, approximately six months before the assignments to the 
appellant bank were recorded. (Record, pp. 102-103, 201-202, 39-
40) 
Appellant's Statement of Fact #23 is misleading 
concerning the resale price of the subject property. The record 
does not show a price for which appellant purchased the property at 
the trust deed foreclosure or the price for which appellant re-sold 
the property. (Record, p. 248) 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. The Real Estate Contract between Debra Youngman and 
Lafayette 'Properties was purportedly dated and notarized by 
defendant Youngman's business associate and defendant Diamanti. 
The notary seal indicated that the notary commission expired on 
March 14, 1992. (Record, p. 121) Presumably, the document was 
signed during the 4 years prior to the expiration of the notary 
seal. The actual date of execution of the contract is therefore 
not known, but the contract was not recorded until June 29, 1988, 
after the commencement of plaintiff's work. (Record, pp. 112, 99) 
2. Richards commenced painting and remodeling work prior 
to June 29, 1988, and completed his work August 30, 1988. A lien 
was timely filed on November 16, 1988, for $5,499.50. (Record pp. 
3 6-40; 99, 'paragraph 6; 102; 302) 
3. In July 1988 Youngman refinanced the subject real 
estate for $320,000 and paid off several prior encumbrances. The 
6 
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financing institutions relied on an appraisal of the property of 
over $500,000. (Record, pp. 208, 216, 223) The underwriter at the 
time of closing identified the loan as one with "good ratios" and 
"very low loan value." (Record, p. 216) 
4. When the refinancing loan closed, the encumbrances 
against the property were increased by $16,453.05, most of which 
were paid to the financing institutions as fees for arranging the 
refinancing. (Record, p. 218) 
5. From the loan proceeds, $53,546.00 was paid to 
defendant Youngman's corporation Lafayette Properties. (Record, 
pp. 157, 174, 178) Borrower Youngman was an endorser with her 
business associate Diamanti on the $53,546.00 check paid to 
Lafayette Properties.1 (Record, pp. 157, 178, 63) 
6. At the time of the loan closing, a deed from 
Lafayette Properties to Youngman was executed and recorded. 
Defendant Diamanti signed the deed on behalf of Lafayette 
Properties'under authority of a purported power of attorney. The 
deed was recorded by U.S. Title Insurance Company at the very same 
time as the other refinancing documents were recorded (July 7, 
12:12 p.m.) (Record, pp. 172, 187) The deed and the real estate 
contract between Lafayette and Youngman were both recorded after 
Richards commenced his lienable work. (Record, pp. 112, 99, 101, 
39, 40) 
1Debra Youngman was vice president of Lafayette in 1985 and 
was an endorser of the bank's check to Lafayette. She had a joint 
personal business account with Diamanti as supported by the record. 
(Record, pp. 63, 136-137, 157-158) 
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7. The interest of Ameristar was assigned to First 
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. and then from First Boston to 
Security Pacific National Bank. Both assignments are dated October 




The facts and equities in this case do not lend 
themselves to application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation. 
Appellee asserts there was no material misunderstanding by the 
lower courts and, in any event, the issues appellant disputes would 
have had no bearing on the decision of either the trial court or 
the Court of Appeals. All facts must be considered and equity be 
of overriding consideration before equity will relieve the clear 
operation of law. The Court of Appeals stated: 
An individual's access to equitable 
subrogation as a "remedy depends upon the 
principles of justice, equity, and benevolence 
to be applied to the facts of the particular 
case." Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d at 1140. 
The Court of Appeals found that in equitable subrogation cases, 
"[t]he equitable nature of the doctrine prevents articulation of an 
unwavering rule that applies in all cases." (Opinion, p. 4) A 
footnote to the opinion in the case at bar is very expressive on 
the fact sensitivity of this type of case. 
Furthermore, this case illustrates the 
wasteful nature of litigation over the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation. 
Plaintiff's five thousand dollar lien has most 
recently been the subject of a judgment, 
8 
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including costs and fees, of nearly ten 
thousand dollars. That does not include the 
costs or fees relating to this appeal, which 
plaintiff also recovers. The nature of 
situations in which equitable remedies are 
applicable are highly fact sensitive and will 
always require a significant amount of legal 
work to present. Thus, encouraging simple 
contractual solutions is sound public policy. 
(Opinion, p. 9) 
The court also found that between commercially 
sophisticated lenders and mechanics' materialmen, the legislature 
favored the statutory protection given to mechanic's lien holders 
based on constructive or actual notice. The Court of Appeals found 
as the trial court did that "[b]ased on the undisputed facts of 
record and equities between the parties, the court concludes that 
the doctripe of equitable subrogation as claimed by defendant 
Security Pacific is not applicable in this case." (Opinion, pp. 2-
3) The court held that Security Pacific's interest was inferior 
and subordinate to appellee's mechanic's lien. 
Point I 
The Application of Constructive and/or 
Actual Notice was Properly Interpreted by 
the Court of Appeals 
In appropriate circumstances constructive notice will 
defeat application of equitable subrogation. The Court of Appeals 
is not enumerating an unwaverable rule of constructive notice. 
Equity cases by their very nature must be evaluated on their 
uniquely different fact situations. In this case the constructive 
notice of outside painting work beginning over 9 days prior to 
refinancing was found to be sufficient basis to sustain the trial 
9 
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court's decision. The Court of Appeals therefore did not have to 
address in detail the numerous other equitable issues which 
supported the trial court decision. 
The appellant correctly indicates that actual knowledge 
would be an absolute bar to equitable subrogation. Badger Coal and 
Lumber v. 01 sen, 167 P. 680 (Utah 1917) In the case before the 
court, the trial court never had to address the issue of whether 
the bank (appellant's predecessor) had actual knowledge or only 
constructive knowledge. Defendant Youngman (the bank's client) 
knew that Richards had started his painting work sometime before 
June 29 and therefore she had actual knowledge. Bank loan 
documents were not signed until July 7. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's decision which ruled both legally and 
equitably in favor of the painter (appellee). Both courts gave the 
appellant the benefit of the doubt that the bank may have had only 
constructive notice rather than actual notice. 
Appellant relies on George v. Butler, 50 P. 1032 (Utah 
1897) which is also a highly fact sensitive case based on a 
misidentification of a lot. The parties were ultimately placed 
into the equitably correct position based on actual facts. The 
case was decided on the issues of equity, not on the nature of 
constructive or actual notice. 
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals chose to < 
consider constructive notice as a significant element (but not the 
only element) in balancing equities. The Court of Appeals 
concludes that in this fact situation constructive notice was a i 
10 
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sufficient basis to uphold the trial court's findings that the 
equity factors favored the mechanic's lien holder. Appellant 
interprets the opinion as making a universal rule on "constructive 
notice" rather than a rule applicable to this case. Either way, 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals would be correct. However, 
from reading the entire opinion, it appears that this ruling was 
intended to be applicable to facts in this particular case. The 
Court of Appeals recognized that equitable subrogation cases must 
be weighed upon all of the facts. This is apparent from statements 
in the opinion that "[t]he nature of situations in which equitable 
remedies are applicable are highly fact sensitive..." (Opinion, p. 
9) and that "[t]he equitable nature of the doctrine prevents 
articulation of an unwavering rule that applies in all cases." 
(Opinion, p. 4) 
The Court of Appeals used the constructive notice prong 
as a sufficient basis to uphold the trial court's determination 
that the doctrine of equitable subrogation was not applicable. 
Having determined there was a sufficient basis, the Court of 
Appeals did not need to address each of the equitable factors 
favoring the lien holder. 
A number of courts have concluded that constructive 
notice under mechanicfs lien statutes defeats application of 
equitable subrogation. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. First 
Security Bank, 491 P.2d 1261 (Idaho 1971); but see Smith v. State 
Savings & Loan Assoc, 223 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301, 175 Cal.App.3d 
1091, 1099 (Cal.App. 1985) The two Utah cases relied on by 
11 
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appellant, -Martin v. Hickenlooper. 59 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1936) and 
George v. Butler, 50 P. 1032 (Utah 1897), allowed equitable relief 
on issues other than constructive notice. They determined 
constructive notice was immaterial to the particular decisions. 
The appellant seeks to create a negative interpretation from these 
cases that constructive notice should not be considered in 
equitable subrogation cases. The fact that in those cases the 
issue of constructive notice was not controlling does not negate it 
as an important consideration. The Court of Appeals readily 
acknowledged that the very nature of equitable subrogation prevents 
articulation or an unwaverable rule that would be universally 
applicable* The fact that in this case constructive notice was a 
sufficient basis to uphold the trial court's decision does not 
create an unwaverable rule in all cases. The very nature of equity 
allows for "wavering" rules when justice so requires. Justice did 
not require wavering the rules of law in this case. 
Point II 
Constructive Notice is Sufficient Notice 
to Protect Mechanic's Lien Rights 
In mechanic's lien cases the legislature has specifically 
adopted the concept of "constructive notice" as controlling in 
establishing a "relation back" date for determining the priority of 
mechanic's liens over other encumbrances. The Court of Appeals < 
held that "[t]he mechanics' lien statutes are an expression of 
legislative intent that should stay the hand of equity in this 
situation. If we held otherwise, we would violate the equitable ( 
12 
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maxim that equity follows the law." (Opinion, p. 8) In finding 
that appellee commenced visible work on the property prior to the 
Ameristar refinancing, the court found that equitable subrogation 
was not available in this situation. 
Utah mechanic's lien cases recognize the importance of 
constructive notice by requiring visible signs of construction so 
that the "relation back" doctrine makes subsequently filed liens 
effective as of the date of commencement of construction. "From 
the time the contractor begins to furnish materials, it is notice 
to anyone thereafter contracting with the owner that the property 
is burdened with a lien..." Teahen v. Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 P. 
764; First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel and 
Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) There is clear legislative 
intent to create a priority for a mechanic's lien claimant that is 
established by constructive notice whether or not there is actual 
notice. Whether a primary mortgage or a judgment lien or a 
conveyance has a priority over a mechanic's lien is generally 
determined on the basis of "constructive notice." Said liens are 
generally not filed until after work is completed and the lien 
claimant has not been timely paid. Therefore, those seeking an 
interest in the land must see what is there to be seen or be 
considered constructively so informed. It should be no different 
for an entity that seeks to alter, increase, consolidate, or modify 
existing encumbrances. The legislative intent to give this 
priority to mechanic's lien holders and expect equity to follow the 
law should not be disturbed. 
13 
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SUMMARY 
The combination of equity following the law, the 
statutory intent, and the constructive notice gives a right of 
protection to mechanic's lien holders which should not be muddied. 
The Supreme Court should let the legislative priority for lien 
claimants and the rulings of the Court of Appeals stand. Otherwise 
a Pandora's box could be opened of entities trying to leapfrog over 
prior established secured parties to establish preferred positions. 
The Court of Appeals ruling does not interfere with the application 
of equitable relief in appropriate situations. Equity cases should 
be decided on the equity facts at the trial court levels. The 
Supreme Court should decline appellee's request for certiorari. 
DATED this T day of May 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH R. TATE, JR. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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